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a call to resist illegitimate authority

WHAT KIND OF
PEACE
MOVEMENT?
Since its beginnings in 1967, Resist has been primarily
an anti-war organization. And our funding has reflected
this: in 1981, for example, 38 out of 72 grants went to
peace or anti-draft organizations.
Yet we have always been conscious of the need to give
strong support to organizations working in other areas:
civil liberties, social justice, labor, feminism, and antiracism. This reflects the view that not only are such
movements important in themselves, but that our
efforts to build the peace movement can not be successful unless we are also successful in creating a broad
movement against "illegitimate authority" in all aspects
of life.
The growing danger. of war, and the consequent
annihilation of our civilization raises the question of
whether it is wise to continue to spread our resources
across much of the spectrum of our movement's work,
rather than to concentrate our energy and funds on antiwar work alone. It certainly can be argued, and is being
argued, that the issue of survival is fundamental, and
that all of our political hopes will be ended if the arms
race is not brought quickly into check. Shouldn't we
concentrate our forces, creating the largest possible
coalition for nuclear disarmament? Aren't other issues
diversions, or sources of disunity that should be temporarily put on the shelf. until survival is assured?
These questions do not allow for a simple answer, and
yet Resist must address them in a practical way each
time we decide how to allocate our grant money. Our
present understanding is that the peace movement has
no choice but to see itself as part of a broad progressive
movement if it is to achieve its goals. The sources of
violence and potential nuclear destruction are deep, and
do not depend on a particular set of leaders who occupy
positions of power. For peace to be assured we must
make substantial progress in limiting the concentration
of power in the hands of the rich, in dismantling hierarchies of domination and exploitation, and in combatting ideologies of inequality, white supremacy, and antifeminism. Failing to address these issues will tend to
limit anti-war activity to those for whom they are of
little importance, and prevent us from becoming a
majority in this country.

THE SPECIAL
SESSION ON
DISARMAMENT
FRANK BRODHEAD
The organizers of the demonstrations scheduled next
June to coincide with the UN Special Session on Disarmament recently made an important decision. Faced
with proposals to include issues of US intervention
prominently in the demonstrations, the organizers voted
these proposals down. The focus of the demonstrations
will continue to be on the danger of the nuclear arms
race and the enormous drain on human resources it
causes.
While these are obviously important - life and death
- issues, the decision raises some important questions.
First, can the issues really be separated? What is the
linkage in the real world between nuclear war and
conventional . war, whether intervention into Third
World conflicts or a "conventional" war between
nuclear powers? And second, does this emphasis on
nuclear weapons alone really help build, and not divide,
the peace movement? For it is argueq that a focus on
nuclear weapons is not only appropriate because of their
danger, but that including other issues such as US intervention would be divisive within the consensus that is
emerging about the threat of nuclear war. And hanging
over this discussion is the dramatic growth of the peace·
movement in Europe, where a single focus - no nuclear
weapons, East or West - has organized massive
demonstrations against war. Wouldn't a similar focus
create a mass movement here as well?
In the first place, this is not Europe, and it makes no
sense whatsoever to derive the goals of the US peace
movement from the experience of the peace movement
in Britain or the Netherlands. We live in the heartland
of not only the nuclear weapons power, but the imperial
gendarme as well. It is our nation that has inflicted so
much suffering on countries of the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and now Central America, and we have a
moral obligation to do what we can to stop it. It is all
very well to be mobilized for peace when our cities are
threatened with destruction, and ourselves and our
friends threatened with instant or lingering death. But
death and destruction are no less real when they are
inflicted by our armies or those of our surrogates on the
(continued on oaac 2)

peasant populations of the Third World, even if no
nuclear warheads are involved. The point is that this
demonstration is occuring in the US, organized by the
US peace movement, and it is irrational bordering on
racist to limit our disarmament demands to those
weapons that threaten the white populations of the
world, while leaving unchallenged those used daily to
kill darker skinned peoples.
Secondly, what is divisive and what is unifying about
different demands for disarmament? The peace movement needs to think this through quickly, for the rapid
growth of our ranks is electrifying. Each week finds a
new "professionals for social responsibility" organization springing up. We are daily made aware of new
people, new sectors of people who have never been
touched by the peace movement and are now terrified
about the dangers of nuclear war. Yet we would be blind
not to see that this popular movement for peace is growing across a wide spectrum, and is not confined simply
to the issues of nuclear weapons. We can see that the
fear of widespread popular opposition is suppressing
the Reagan Administration's natural inclinations in
Central America, and that the periodic sputterings of
the anti-draft movement have served notice on the
Administration that this issue is trouble, and one better
postponed until after the 1982 elections . Yet it seems
likely that Haig and Co. will find itself with little choice
but to rush more US aid to prop up the military regime
in El Salvador this spring. And the Administration has
no choice but to proceed with the prosecution (now
scheduled to begin in March) of those young men who
failed or refused to register for the draft. Both Administration moves can be expected to tap the latent energies
of strong movements for peace, which have proven their
vigor in the past with quick, dramatic outpourings of
opposition to the government. Wouldn't the Special
Session demonstration organizers be wise to anticipate
such a mobilization this spring and reach out to include
its energies in the campaign against nuclear weapons?
Can this be done while rejecting the proposal to include
the issue of intervention in a disarmament focus, or
when the issue of the draft is scarcely mentioned?
What about the real world connection between nuclear
weapons and conventional warfare? Particularly at a
time when the peace movement is growing so quickly,
experienced leaders have an obligation to educate new
recruits to our ranks, and fill them in on our best efforts
to get at the root causes of the arms race. This is particularly important in the linkage between conventional and
nuclear war, because a substantial sector of "informed
opinion" now says that we need to bolster our conventional forces in Europe in order not to be so dependent
on nuclear weapons. If we are serious about lessening
the possibility that nuclear weapons be used, goes this
argument, we would bring back the draft, step up our
chemical warfare capabilities, and build a lot of tanks.
We know that this connection between conventional
and nuclear warfare is at least a half truth, and that the
most likely scenario for nuclear war is one which
emerges from a conventional clash in Central Europe.
But the best guessing is that such a clash would itself

grow out of a US-Soviet clash in the Third World; and
what information is available shows that many of the
occasions when the US contemplated using nuclear
weapons in the past grew out of real or alleged superpower conflict in the Third World.
The connection between nuclear and conventional
warfare also works the other way. The drive by the US
to regain clear nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union
is primarily intended to give the US a free hand in the
Third World, particularly in areas close to the Soviet
Union such as the Persian Gulf. Only if the level of US
military superiority is clear at each possible stage of
escalation, reasons the Pentagon, will the Soviet Union
refrain from challenging a US intervention that uses
conventional forces. This was the pattern set in Korea
artd Vietnam, but one which has been challenged by the
''essential equivalency'' in nuclear arms that the Soviets
achieved in the 1970s. Nuclear superiority is the umbrella under which the US will police or expand its sphere of
influence, using the Rapid Deployment Force. This was
the clear message of the Carter Doctrine, which threatened to use nuclear weapons if the Soviets challenged
the US in the Persian Gulf.
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If this outline is accepted then it is vital that the
struggle for peace not be divided into "ban the bomb"
and anti-interventionist forces. These struggles are
linked not just in our minds, but in the minds of the
Pentagon as well. The organizers of the demonstrations
around the UN Special Session on Disarmament are
playing a divisive role in the peace movement by separating these issues. They are linked whether we like it or
not, and the job of organizers is to educate people about
reality. If it is too late to persuade the organizers in New
York to emphasize the dangers of conventional warfare,
US intervention or the draft in relationship to nuclear
war, we should try to take up these issues at the local
level, and make the UN Special Session on Disarmament
an occasion to work for a genuine, secure peace.

OUR STAKE IN
SOLIDARITY
FRANK BRODHEAD
The military coup in Poland and the suppression of
the Polish labor movement have aroused widespread
opposition around the world. Little of this opposition
has focused on the specific character and demands of
Solidarity, however. In consequence protests against the
coup have had a largely nationalist character, and have
not distanced themselves from the anti-Soviet rhetoric
of the Reagan Administration. Indeed, we now have the
irony of the most anti-labor Administration in memory
leading the defence of one of the most radical labor
movements in our time.
Or is it a radical movement? The· Polish movement is
clearly nationalist and clearly Catholic. It is also "anticommunist," or at least anti- the kind of ideology and
society that passes for "Communism" in the official
press of both East and West. For these reasons Solidarity has gained at least the verbal support of conservative
Western governments and leaders; and for these reasons
as well sections of the Western left denounce Solidarity
as misguided at best, and at worst as the spearhead of a
US-backed plot to re-establish capitalism in Eastern
Europe.
It is important that we characterize Solidarity correctly, for it is daily becoming more apparent that the EastWest conflict will continue to be exacerbated by the
situation in Poland, with potentially disasstrous
consequences. A good understanding of Solidarity is
particularly important for Americans, because if the
situation in Poland continues to deteriorate, and if the
Soviet Union becomes more overtly involved in the
suppression of Polish labor, the Reagan Administration
will seize the opportunity to divert attention from the
failure of its own economic program, rally the country
around a nationalist military builqup, and greatly
increase the dangers of war.
There is another reason as well to attempt to understand Solidarity better. I believe that it has some lessons
to teach the West, particularly the Western labor movements, because Poland represents the advance guard of
a more general crisis of modern societies. This crisis is
worldwide, rippling out of its twin centers - the US and
the USSR - and eddying into the backwaters of the
spheres of influence of both powers. This is a crisis of
economies built on the "extermination industry," as
E. P. Thompson has called it, economies which now
collectively channel half a trillion dollars a year into
military, waste production. With both economies evolving new governing bureaucracies based on military production - the so-called "Iron Triangle in the US, its
counterpart in the USSR - the tenure of the managers
of the "extermination industry" appears increasingly
secure against appeals to consider the "general
interests" of society. Witness the ineffectual pleas of

Wall St. about the deficit and the military budget.
How can we challenge these twin bureaucracies? How
can we stop this madness? Clearly we are up against
forces so powerful (and so heavily armed!) that only a
massive, popular revolutionary movement will have a
chance. The decisive battles will be fought in the messy
metropolis, not by romantic peasant armies in the
hinterland. It is to movements like Solidarity, not those
like the Sandinistas, that we must look for lessons on
the way forward. Today the collapse occurs in Poland,
and the Polish workers build Solidarity. Tomorrow we
can expect the workers of Britain, Brazil, or Roumania
to find themselves with no choice but to take matters
into their own hands. We need to consciously begin to
build the political and intellectual infrastructure that
will help prepare Americans for the day when we will
have to create a "Solidarity" movement of our own.

SOLIDARITY TRANSFORMED
The history of Solidarity is that of an organization
transformed from one maintaining that it was only a
trade union, and had no "political" interests, to one
which began to assume responsibility for the whole
·society. In the end Solidarity became an alternative
government-in-waiting, lacking only the tolerance of its
neighbors for it to simply announce that the old regime
was abolished and a new one had taken its place.
How was this transformation accomplished? In many
respects it was latent in Solidarity's origins. First there
was the question of democracy. Emerging from a
general strike in August 1980, Solidarity developed a
style of work in which negotiations were broadcast to
the entire workforce, and in which decisions were
preceded by lengthy discussion in search of a consensus.
No more "leaders of the people" to give orders. As a
consequence accurate information became a common
objective of the workers' movement, and in the months
ahead workers would fight for the end of censorship,
and a vigorous press would lauch 600 different Solidarity publications alone.
Secondly, there were the demands themselves. In
August 1980 the shipyard workers in Gdansk forced the
government to agree to their now-famous twenty-one
point program. Heading the list were the demands for
independent trade unions and the right to strike. On the
basis of these two demands, reasoned the workers, all
else could be accomplished. Yet their remaining
demands clearly indicated that though theirs was in
form a trade-union struggle, in essence it recognized
that in a modern, state-dominated economy and society
there is little real distinction between "political" and
"economic" demands. The Polish workers, for
example, demanded a reduction of privileges for police
and Party officials, pay raises that would narrow the
wages gap within the working class itself, and improvements in daycare, maternity leaves, and housing. They
demanded not only that strike leaders be let out of
prison, but that intellectuals and others who were jailed
because they aided the workers' struggles be released as
well. They demanded that honest information about

their struggle be broadcast to the entire nation, and that
corrupt officials be replaced.
Finally, the form of self-organization of the strikers
foretold what was to come. Led by the shipyard
workers, the workers in the Gdansk area formed a strike
committee representing all the plants, all the workers in
the region. This form was copied by workers in other
regions of Poland, and at the end of the strike the
regional strike committees formed a loose national
structure, Solidarity. Thus at the outset Solidarity was
prepared to represent all the population, not just
workers in particular crafts, plants, or industries. Its
structure mirrored that of the Party and the government
itself.
The potential latent in the August struggle was soon
realized. While the Western press gave prominence to
the role of religion and the Church, and to the personality of Walesa, workers concerned themselves with
questions of production and workers' rights. Would the
Gdansk Agreement be implemented at the local level?
What about wage increases? Would the police beating
of union activists go unpunished? What about a fiveday workweek? Would Solidarity be allowed to determine its own organizational structure and constitutional
form? In each of these cases and others, Polish workers
were forced to use or threaten to use the strike weapon
to settle their grievances. They had no other weapons at
hand: elections, parliamentary lobbying, compulsory
arbitration and grievance procedures - the staples of
the Western labor movement were closed to them.
Direct action, not representative action in a Congress or
behind the scenes, was forced on the workers if they
were to pursue their struggle at all. And thanks to Solidarity's regional structure, each successive struggle
became a massive teach-in, a program of public education showing how struggles were connected, and that
victory depended on labor solidarity. An injury to one
was everybody's business.
By the summer of 1981 it had become increasingly
clear that the economy was headed for disaster. No
more credits could be obtained from abroad, and Western banks had pulled a billion dollars in deposits out of
Polish banks. No more food or raw materials or spare
parts or replacement machinery could be imported. Production bottlenecks became more acute, as essential
components or raw materials could not be found to
finish a product, in turn depriving some other production process of a necessary step. Everything that could
be exported was, in order to earn precious hard currency
to repay Poland's debts, resulting in tremendous shortages. Demonstrations and then riots agairtst the shortages began to break out. Solidarity, indeed all of
Poland, began to realize that if the economic crisis were
not resolved, their society might disintegrate.
But how was this to be done? Only a massive mobilization of effort could reverse the nation's economic
decline. Who could have any faith however, in those
who had already mismanaged their local factory or the

entire nation's economy? At the local level, Solidarity
activists pushed for the right to select their own managers, and achieved a number of important successes.

At the national level, however, Solidarity was less
successful in forcing the government to share with it
decision-making power over the nation's economy.
Instead the government wanted Solidarity to share the
responsibility for a regime of austerity. "They want us
to pull our load, like workhorses," said the workers.
"But we want to hold the reins as well, so that they
won't take any more wrong turns."
In attempting to solve this impasse, Solidarity hit
upon an ingenious plan, but a revolutionary one in the
eyes of the government. In the summer and fall of 1981
they worked out a plan to directly administer a portion
of the society's production and distribution. They
would do this by working on the "free Saturdays" that
their earlier struggles had achieved. But they would do
so only under rule of the workers themselves. "We are
not donating these Saturdays to the authorities," they
said, "but to ourselves. Insofar as we do so we are here
and now inaugurating the principles of self-manage-
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ment.'' They proposed that on Saturdays each factory
would be administered by its factory commission or
committee for self-management. The additional
production thus achieved would also be administered
by the workers themselves. "If Polish society responds
to our appeal," concluded their resolution, "then Solidarity must do everything to keep all extra production
under constant scrutiny in order that the increased
efforts of working people not be wasted. This will constitute the first great test of the constructive power of
employees' self-management.''
If this plan had been implemented it would have given
Solidarity control over the allocation of a sizeable fraction of the nation's output of basic goods, and thus a
foothold toward the union's goal of "socializing" the
planning process. But of course it was not to be. Confronted with the choice of either sharing power or crushing Solidarity, the regime chose the course of repression. The deployment of small squads of soldiers to the

countryside, the arrest and harassment of union militants, the deliberate aggravation of the food crisis, and
other moves by the regime we can now see were preparatory steps to the military coup.
JUNTA SOCIALISM

The military coup of mid-December is not the end of
the struggle of the Polish people, but the beginning of a
new chapter in that struggle. Many things are now lost:
the renewal of civic life and voluntary organizations, a
flourishing press and the transformation of universities
into centers of intellectual inquiry. Also gone is any
lingering trust in the authorities and confidence in the
military, trusts which always struck Western observers
as overly credulous, but ones which were affirmed again
and again by Polish citizens. The most important loss,
of course, is the beachhead of legal space achieved by
Solidarity's nonnegotiable demands in August 1980:

'76'80

free and independent trade unions, and the right to
strike.
The centrality of workplace organization for Solidarity can be seen in the initial response to the military
coup. While Western reporters strained from the
confines of their hotel windows to see large, open-air
demonstrations in the streets of Warsaw - and failing
to see them reported little resistance to the coup - the
Polish people chose to organize their self-defense
around the workplaces where Solidarity was born and
where it retained its organizational focus. A report from
the Polish Workers' Task Force in late December, for
example, said that 200 plants were occupied throughout
Poland, and that at 700 plants workers were not let in to
work. In many cases there were reports of family and
community supporters massing outside the plants or
mines to block the police attack. Though workers also
attempted to defend Solidarity headquarters and to
organize street demonstrations in some areas, the most

significant form of resistance was factory occupation.
The Church was a place of refuge, but not a center for
self-defence.
This should not be surprising. Factory occupations
are a uniquely twentieth-century form of working class
self-defense, representing the endurance of anarchosyndicalist tendencies in the modern labor movement.
That the Polish workers chose to adopt it helps us to see
the link between their struggle and the great strikes in
northern Italy in 1920, the sit-in strikes in Detroit in
1936-37, the factory occupations in France in 1968, or
the cordones in Chile in 1972-73. In each case workers
built a community of struggle and self-governance within and around the great concentrations of capital and
industry. So much the center of daily life in "normal"
times, the factory became a fortress where the most
expensive machinery in the nation was held hostage,
insurance against the potential violence of the state.
Each of these occupations, as well as those in Poland, of
course had different outcomes; and it is perhaps significant that the only clear success occurred in Detroit,
where the goals of the struggle were modest - union
recognition - and not sufficiently threatening to the
state power to justify the use of overwhelming armed
force.
What makes Poland's future so grim is that the
authorities seem to have chosen with uncanny skill a
method for regaining control of society which is guaranteed to exacerbate the Polish crisis. Given a decade of
economic mismanagement and investment policies
which in retrospect are seen as insane, and given the
international economic straitjacket in which Poland
now finds itself, any hope for recovery must rest on
mobilizing the enthusiasm and productive initiative of
vast numbers of people. Only a program which clearly
shares austerity on an equitable basis, and which offers
hope for the future, can enlist the creative capacities of
people to the extent necessary for national recovery.
Instead, the authorities have chosen to destroy the networks and fabric of informal relationships around
which productive work is really carried out. By destroying Solidarity the authorities have rejected any accommodation with the accumulated experience that such
networks have achieved over the past quarter century,
of which Solidarity was the expression and the outcome.
What alternative to workers' control do the Polish
authorities present as a means to reorganize the labor
force and raise the level of production? A week after the
military coup there was a meeting between representatives of the government and the top managers of the
thirty largest factories in Poland to address this question. According to a memo prepared by a government
representative and published in Solidarity's underground Information Bulletin, the meeting concluded
that "It is absolutely necessary to institute reform,
immediately. We cannot allow the creation of a vacuum
in the wake of the ... suppression of trade unions. In
the factories in the future, trade unions and workers
self-government should be created. In the majority of
factories, however, the composition of these selfgoverning boards will have to be changed .... A condi-

survive the repression. "Eagerly carry out even the most
idiotic orders,'' urges the document. ''Do not solve
problems on your own. Throw that task onto the shoulders of commissars and informers ..... Sooner or later
the commissar will want to be left in peace. THIS WILL
MARK THE BEGINNING OF THE END OF DICTATORSHIP."
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Zenon Januszewski, Polish Workers Party, 1942-1962

tion of winning the trust of the workforce is: the
improvement of the quality of propaganda, and
conducting a dialogue with the workers." Yet how can
this be done, now that Polish workers understand what
real self-governance is, and now that they have experienced the junta's chosen method of "dialogue?"
Some indication of the government's strategy
appeared in early February. According to US newspaper
reports, the Polish authorities were considering reorganizing trade unions along industrial and professional
lines, rather than the regional federations organized by
Solidarity. The government's goal will be to encourage a
new trade-union structure that isolates workers from
each other, rather than allowing the workplaces to serve
as foci of class-wide regional organizations as before. In
a statement that would warm Lane Kirkland's heart,
government spokesman Jerzy Urban asked, "What
interests, for instance, do a shoemaker and a pilot have
in common? Sharing a territory doesn't mean they have
common interests."
The Polish workers have a different viewpoint. They
are well aware that for the immediate future their cooperation and even enthusiasm at the workplace is necessary to end Poland's economic crisis. And, as before,
they will decline to participate on the basis of the terms
offered them by the authorities. A clear indication of
this can be seen in a document called "Basic Principles
of Resistance,'' printed in Solidarity's Information Bulletin No. 8 (December 28, 1981). The document outlines
a plan of guerilla warfare that combines the slowdown
and work-to-rule tactics known to trade unionists
throughout the world with injunctions to maintain the
levels of comradeship and mutual aid necessary to

This is the formula for a protracted struggle between
the Polish people and their state, centered around a desperate attempt by the authorities to extract a greater
level of production and efficiency from a workforce
which has made it a matter of class and national pride
not to cooperate. The suffering and rebellion that will
surely follow can only lead to a police state, and to
continued danger and instability in Central Europe.
Both the peace movement and the Left in the US will be
faced with extremely strong pressures to treat Poland as
strictly a Cold War issue, and will find many within our
own ranks who will portray the Polish workes as simply
the victims of either Western bankers or of Soviet agression. There will be little space given us to present the
Polish people as the subjects of history as well as the
objects of fate, as seekers after a path of radical change
and self-governance that continues and helps expand the
tradition of libertarian workers movements in this century. Yet we must seize this space and enlarge it, for it
allows us to argue that the Polish workers movement
has much to teach us in the West, and that learned properly its lessons will help us to find a genuine path
through the crisis of our time.

RESOURCES

Committee in Support of Solidarity, 275 Seventh Ave.,
New York, NY 10011.
"Who Are the Workers in Polish Solidarity - and
What Do They Want?", an excellent pamphlet by
Andrej Tymowski. Available for $0.50 from Commonwork Pamphlets, PO Box 2026, New Haven, CT 06521.

THE INTELLIGENCE
IDENTITIES
PROTECTION ACT
The "Intelligence Identities Protection Act" is
working its way through Congress (H.R. 4; S. 391), and
few Americans are aware of the very real threat which it
poses to Freedom of Speech and Freedom of the Press.
Scores of constitutional law experts have said that it is
clearly unconstitutional, but its sponsors suggest leaving
that problem to the courts. Even the author of the
House version, Rep. Boland (Dem.-Mass.), has admitted
that the bill "could subject a private citizen to criminal
prosecution for disclosing unclassified information
obtained from unclassified sources."
This bill represents an Official Secrets Act, and
citizens must be aware of the myths which surround the
public perception of the bill. These myths have been
created by the constant references to the bill as the
"Names of Agents Act" or the "Anti-Agee Act" or the
"bill to get the Covert Action Information Bulletin."
None of these characterizations is accurate. We hope
that the following information will help people to speak
out against this bill, to urge its defeat.
• The bill covers unclassified material. People believe
this bill deals only with releasing information which is
obtained from classified material. There is nothing in
the bill which limits its scope in this way. In fact, it is
specifically designed to suppress revelations derived
purely from unclassified material. It prohibits the disclosure of " any information that identifies an individual as a covert agent." This applies even if the information comes from a book on a library shelf, or from a
newspaper published anywhere, or from a chance
remark overheard in the hallway.
• The bill covers the FBI, military intelligence, and
other agencies, as well as the CIA. Many people think
the bill applies only to the disclosure of undercover CIA
officers. This is not true. Most significantly, it also
applies to the ''foreign counterintelligence and counterterrorism components" of the FBI, as well as to the
intellignece divisions of the military services, and all the
other intelligence agencies, such as the National Security
Agency. This bill would prevent an organization from
exposing and expelling an FBI informer discovered in its
midst, even if discovered through entirely legal and
open means.
• The bill is not limited to the exposure of government employees. The bill does not merely cover CIA
case officers or FBI undercover agents. It covers present
and former government employees, agents, informants,
and what are called "sources of operational assistance.'' Under the bill, for example, the famous
Washington Post story which disclosed that the CIA
had been making annual payments to King Hussein of
Jordan would be criminal. Many articles about the CIA
connections of the Watergate conspirators would have
been unlawful.

• The bili-is not even limited to ''names.' ' Supporters
of the bill suggest that since it deals with "names of
agents" it should not affect mainstream journalists,
because one can expose an illegal or immoral operation
without having to name the names of the individuals
involved. This is also untrue. The bill speaks of "information that identifies" an undercover operative or
source. As any journalist knows, it is almost impossible
to present information which exposes some operation
without giving away some information from which one
could deduce the identities of the people involved.
• The bill virtually eliminates "whistleblowing" in
the intelligence field. The experience of the last several
years certainly teaches that if there is any area of
government susceptible to horrendous abuses it is the
field of intelligence. This bill will have the effect of
eliminating the possibility of ''whistleblowing'' by
anyone in the intelligence field, because, as pointed out
above, exposures of abuses, even grossly illegal activities, would invariably involve "information that identifies" some undercover people.
• The alleged protections and limitations in the bill
are meaningless. Much talk has been made of the idea
that the bill is really designed only to "get" publications
like the Covert Action Information Bulletin. Mainstream, or "legitimate" journalists would not be
affected. But the language does not bear that out, and,
obviously, prosecutors will prosecute whom they wish
when they wish . The House bill applies to "whoever, in
the course of an effort to identify and expose covert
agents with the intent to impair or impede the foreign
intelligence activities of the United States ... .. " The
Senate version applies to ''whoever, in the course of a
pattern of activities intended to identify and expose
covert agents and with reason to believe that such
activities would impair or impede the foreign intelligence activities of the United States .... " Neither of
these clauses affords any real protection. The CIA and
other intelligence agencies have stated many times that
the disclosure of any of its personnel or operations
impedes its effectiveness. Anyone writing an intelligence-related story would be aware of that. (When the
Post was considering the King Hussein story, the White
House actually interceded, trying to get the editor to
spike the story, stressing that its publication would
impair US intelligence in the Middle East. Under this
bill, that would surely have set the stage for criminal
prosecution.) What might constitute a "course of an
effort to identify" or a "pattern of activities intended to
identify" is unclear, but it would not take much.
Researching a series of articles, or perhaps even a single
article, would probably suffice. Trying to root out the
informers in one's group would surely be enough. The
notion that this bill has any safeguards whatsoever is
another myth.
This bill must be stopped. Write your Congressional
representative; write letters to your newspaper; explain
what this bill really means. Too few people understand.
The United States cannot afford an Official Secrets Act
especially in these times.
'

For more information write: Covert Action Information Bulletin, PO Box 59272, Washington, DC 20004.

GRANTS

SELECTIVE SERVICE LAW PANEL (1911 Wilshire
Boulevard, Los Angeles, CA 90057)
The SSLP was formed as a project of the National
Lawyers Guild in the mid 1960s to train lawyers and lay
counselors in draft and Selective Service law, and to
develop legal and political strategies for fighting the
draft. It was revitalized under joint sponsorship of the
NLG and ACLU in early 1980, after the announcement
of President Carter's new draft registration program.
The Panel's aim is to make legal skills accessible to
minority communities previously left out of the draft
resistance movement. Along with their mass outreach to
high schools and junior colleges, SSLP is producing a
series of videotapes to be broadcast nationwide over
cable TV. Resist is helping with production costs for one
video program. Aimed at draft-age men and their
families, the show will provide basic facts about how the
draft of the '80s will work and the possible consequences and requirements of various draft-related
options. Also included will be footage of recruits in
infantry training, anti-Vietnam war demonstrations, as
well as images of military build-up. So far, cable
stations in five different areas have agreed to air the
tape when it is completed.

THE BLACK UNITED FRONT (415 Atlantic Avenue,
Brooklyn, NY 11217)
The issue of police brutality has a long and bloody
history in the black community of New York City. The
decade of the seventies saw a marked increase in cases of
police abuse of authority and use of deadly force against
African-Americans, especially young people. The BUF
originally became active during what is known as the
"Bloody Summer of '78 ." Since then they have played a
major role in organizing black and Hispanic
neighborhoods, helping to form coalitions and
participating in lobbying efforts to win greater recognition of police repression. The Police Brutality
Investigative Unit of the BUF has received wide acclaim
from many community groups because it provides the
city's only source of information about citizens' rights
in cases of arrest and police abuse. The group has
prepared leaflets and brochures, outlining what
constitutes police brutality and instructing citizens on
procedures in such cases. They have also developed and
screened the first factual slideshows on riots and the use
of deadly police force. The PBIU Newsletter is also used
for citizen information on brutality and for documenting case histories of police abuse. Resist's grant was to
buy office and newsletter supplies.
COALITION FOR BASIC HUMAN NEEDS (10 West
Street, Boston, MA 02111)

The CBHN is a welfare rights organization currently
fighting against the proposed Community Work Experience, commonly known as "workfare." The plan
would allow the Massachusetts Department of Public
Welfare to require welfare mothers to "work off" their
welfare grants and food stamp allotments as a condition
of receiving public aid. Approximately 60,000 families
would be affected. Workfare is not a job; it is forced,
unpaid labor. It would allow a woman no choice over
where she is placed, what she does, or even when she
works. She would receive no benefits, no sick days, no
vacation. She might be placed alongside union workers
where she would be a potential unwilling scab. While
she is working, her children would be placed, not in a
licensed child care facility, but with another workfare
mother who is unpaid, untrained, and has not chosen to
be a daycare provider. Mothers would have little or no
choice over the home in which children are place, nor
any guarantee that they would not be abused or neglected by unwilling babysitters. CBHN has marshalled all
its forces to fight this plan. By holding demonstrations,
mobilizing other organizations, and distributing
volumes of informational materials, they have managed
to get the program postponed temporarily. Resist is
helping to sustain their efforts by contributing to literature costs.
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CLERGY AND LAITY CONCERNED and COALITION OPPOSING REGISTRATION AND THE
DRAFT (795 Willamette, Room 302, Eugene, OR
97401)
CALC of Lane County is an interfaith organization
actively working on human rights and disarmament
issues. Along with staffing a high school outreach
program, they serve as a resource center and provide
printed and audiovisual materials to schools, churches,
and community groups. About three years ago CALC
helped with the formation of CORD. Currently, the two
organizations share an office and work together often,
especially in interracial outreach. Last year CORD
received a grant from Resist for the purchase of a telephone answering machine, which has greatly helped
both counseling and the general cohesiveness of the
organization. This time Resist is helping both groups
with an outreach program to minority communities
concerning the draft and the role of the military in
society. The program will include a slideshow and film
series, distribution of an informational brochure in
English and Spanish, and draft counseling advertisements in Spanish.

THE RESIST PLEDGE SYSTEM
The most important source of our income is monthly
pledges . Pledges help us to plan ah_e ad by stabilizing
our monthly income. In addition to receiving the newsletter, pledges get a monthly reminder letter, containing
some news of recent grants. If you would like to learn
more, drop us a note.

